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1 Introduction
The problem of finding the most general conditions required to guarantee a unique compet-
itive equilibrium (CE in short) for a general-equilibrium system is complex and challenging
mathematically. By enlarging the problem, an approach is proposed that both offers a
solution and facilitates an interesting selection.1
There appear to be two basic ways to obtain the uniqueness of equilibrium in economic
models. The first is to seek reasonable conditions within the mathematical structure of a
given economic model. A good example of this is the explorations of the conditions for an
exchange economy that guarantee gross substitutability. The second is to extend or modify
the actual model. In this paper we are concerned with the latter approach. Morris and Shin
(2000) have approached the obtaining of the uniqueness via uncertainty of the information
conditions, utilizing the global games formulation of Carlsson and van Damme (1993). Our
approach is based on a different fact of economic life. If, instead of viewing the general
equilibrium economy non-strategically, we must accept default as a strategic possibility,
then every society should have rules to handle such a possibility. We introduce these default
conditions and argue the uniqueness and other properties from them. Economic dynamics
require institutions to carry process. As such, it appears to be quite plausible that there are
many contributing factors that can lead to the same phenomenon. We believe that there
may be several different economic factors that contribute to the uniqueness of equilibrium.
However, institutionally, the presence of default conditions is certainly of importance.
To investigate the possibility of obtaining the uniqueness of CE from default conditions,
we consider a simple mechanism for an economy that requires trade be in a credit money
1The problem of the uniqueness of competitive equilibrium is not a mere mathematical curiosity. It raises
basic questions in macroeconomics in the employment of any dynamic model. It can be avoided by limiting
oneself to sufficiently low dimensional models as has been done by those using dynamic programming models
of macro-micro economic phenomena, where a single good is put up for sale and bought for cash (see
Shubik and Whitt 1973, Lucas 1978, and Karatzas, Shubik and Sudderth 1994, for examples). However,
the difficulties remain for higher dimensional problems.
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issued by a government bank. Before trading begins, traders exchange personal IOUs for
the credit money with the bank charging them an interest rate of zero. Each trader may
exchange personal IOUs for the credit money without limit. But, after he has bought
and received income from selling, he goes to the bank to settle up all outstanding credit.2
Ending up with net credit is worthless for him, while a default penalty is levied against
him for ending as a net debtor.3
By including an option to default, the mechanism enlarges the traders’ budget sets. As
a consequence, the mechanism puts stronger conditions on CEs. We say that a CE for an
economy is a selection by the credit mechanism if the CE allocation remains to be a CE
allocation in the presence of the option to default subject to penalties. We refer to CEs
for the economy that can be selected by the mechanism as default-qualified competitive
equilibria (DCEs in short).
We begin investigating the credit mechanismwith a useful property of general-equilibrium
analysis. Namely, under some mild conditions, a CE corresponds to a saddle-point of a
Lagrangian function for each trader. This saddle-point characterization of a CE has useful
applications to the design of default penalties towards the selection of a unique CE, as
well as to the study of the already familiar welfare properties of CE allocations. We then
consider economies for which a uniform credit money can be applied, such that any CE of
the economy can be a unique DCE with suitable default penalties.4 We identify two classes
of such economies. Our analysis is carried out for pure exchange economies. However, we
discuss extensions to production economies via Rader’s equivalence principle.
2One way to play the model in a classroom is at the beginning to give each student a large stack of
banknotes and inform him that at the end of the game, after he has bought and received income from
selling, he has to return exactly the amount he started with initially or he will have to pay a default penalty.
For discussions on various credit mechanisms for the competitive model, the reader is referred to Shubik
(1999).
3For example, default penalties may be in the form of asset confiscation from the debtors or jail sentences
or other societal punishments.
4This will include CEs with the minimal cash flow property. Such CEs are special for the reason that
they minimize the need for a substitute-for-trust in trade.
3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly discusses saddle-
point characterization of a CE and its applications. Section 3 presents results for pure
exchange economies. Section 4 discusses extensions to economies with production and
section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Saddle-Point Characterization of Competitive Equi-
libria
Consider an exchange economy E = {Xi, ui, ai}ni=1 with trader i’s consumption set X i,
utility function ui, and endowment ai. We assume A1: Xi = <m+ ; A2: ui is non-satiated,
continuous, and concave; A3: ai ∈ <m+ with ai 6= 0 and ui(ai) > 0; and A4: For each
commodity 1 ≤ h ≤ m, there is a trader i such that ui(xi + δeh) > ui(xi) for all xi ∈ <m+
and for all δ > 0, where eh ∈ <m is the bundle with ehh = 1 and ehk = 0 for all k 6= h.5
These are familiar assumptions in general-equilibrium analysis. A CE for economy E is a
pair (x̄, p̄) with allocation x̄ = (x̄1, · · · , x̄n) and price vector p̄ such that for all i, x̄i solves
maxui(xi)
subject to:
p̄ · (ai − xi) ≥ 0,








ai. (Market Clearance) (2)
2.1 Saddle Point Characterization
Due to A4, all CE prices are positive. The saddle-point characterization of CEs in The-
orem 1 below is well-known. A proof can be established by applying the saddle-point
characterization of solutions for non-linear programming problems.6
5For any positive integer q, <q+ denotes the non-negative orthant of the q-dimensional Euclidean space
and <q++ denotes the subset of <
q
+ containing vectors in <
q
+ all with positive components.
6See Takayama (1985, p. 75) for the saddle-point characterization of solutions for non-linear program-
ming problems.
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Theorem 1 (Saddle-Point Characterization) Let E = {Xi, ui, ai}ni=1 be an exchange
economy satisfying A1-A4. Then, a pair (x̄, p̄) ∈ <mn+ × <m++ is a CE if and only if x̄
satisfies (2) and there exists a vector λ̄ = (λ̄i)ni=1 ∈ <n++ such that for all i, the triplet
(x̄i, p̄, λ̄i) satisfies
ui(xi) + λ̄ip̄ · (ai − xi) ≤ ui(x̄i) + λ̄ip̄ · (ai − x̄i) ≤ ui(x̄i) + λip̄ · (ai − x̄i), (3)
for all xi ∈ <m+ and for all λi ∈ <+.
Condition (3) is equivalent to (x̄i, λ̄i) being a saddle-point of the Lagrangian function
Li(xi, λi) = ui(xi) + λip · (ai − xi) for utility maximization problem (1). When a triplet
(x̄, p̄, λ̄) satisfies (2) and (3), we call it a competitive triplet and we call x̄, p̄, and λ̄,
respectively, a competitive allocation, a competitive price vector, and a competitive multiplier
vector.
Two applications of Theorem 1 are relevant to the rest of the paper. Corollary 1 below
shows that a competitive allocation maximizes a weighted welfare function with welfare
weights equal to the reciprocals of the associated competitive multipliers. Corollary 2
shows that under some additional conditions, there is a one-to-one correspondence between
CEs and competitive multiplier vectors.
Corollary 1 Assume E = {X i, ui, ai}ni=1 satisfies A1-A4. If (x̄, p̄, λ̄) ∈ <mn+ ×<m++ ×<n++










i − xi) ≥ 0,
xi ∈ <m+ , i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
(4)
Corollary 1 follows easily from Theorem 1. For this reason, its proof is omitted.
Corollary 2 Assume E = {X i, ui, ai}ni=1 satisfies A1 and A4. Assume further E satisfies
A20: ui is non-satiated, continuously differentiable, and strictly concave;
5
A5: CE allocations are all interior allocations.7
Then, there is a one-to-one correspondence between CEs and competitive multiplier vectors
for economy E.
Proof. Let (x̄, p̄) be a CE. Then, by A5, x̄i ∈ <m++ for all i. Consequently, by A20 and
the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, the competitive multiplier vectors λ̄ ∈ <n+ that correspond to
(x̄, p̄) satisfy 8
5ui(x̄i) = λ̄ip̄, i = 1, 2, · · · , n. (5)
The uniqueness of these competitive multiplier vectors follows from the above equation.
Conversely, by Corollary 1, competitive allocations that correspond to competitive mul-
tiplier vector λ̄ solve problem (4). By the strict concavity of the utility functions, problem
(4) has a unique solution given λ̄. It thus follows that λ̄ determines a unique competitive
allocation x̄. By A5, x̄i ∈ <m++ for all i. Thus, by the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for problem







This shows that given λ̄, the Lagrangian multiplier vector p̄ for problem (4) is unique.
Since the price vector associated with competitive allocation x̄ is necessarily a Lagrangian
multiplier vector for problem (4), it must be unique.
The one-to-one correspondence in Corollary 2 implies that the products λ̄ip̄, i =
1, 2, · · · , n, are uniquely determined in any CE under the conditions in the corollary.
7A sufficient condition to guarantee the interiority of the CE allocations is for all i, ui(xi) > ui(yi)
whenever xi is an interior bundle and yi is a corner bundle. The reason is that all CE prices are strictly
positive under A4 and hence the value of each trader’s endowment at these prices are positive.
8Here 5ui(x̄i) denotes the gradient of ui at x̄i.
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3 Results
Competitive equilibrium prices are homogeneous of degree zero. Consequently, prices can
be normalized without changing competitive allocations. The effects of price normalization
on competitive multipliers, hence on marginal utilities of income of the traders is rarely
considered in the literature. In what follows it will become clear that those effects are
important in the construction of a credit mechanism for selecting a unique CE.
Suppose that traders use a credit money to buy or sell goods. A bank provides the
credit money of zero interest. Before trading begins, traders exchange personal IOUs for
the credit money with the bank for as much as he wants. But, after he has bought and
received income from selling, trader i settles up all outstanding credit with the bank. Trader
i pays a penalty of μi > 0 in units of i’s utility for each unit of debt he is unable to repay,
while it is of no value to him for ending as a net creditor. Since trade is in credit money,
it is natural to measure prices in terms of the money. Set μ = (μi)ni=1. The credit money
and default penalties together transforms economy E into Eμ, in which trader i has utility
function
U i(xi, p) = ui(xi) + μimin[p · ai − p · xi, 0]. (6)
A CE for Eμ is a pair (x∗, p∗) such that for all i, x∗i solves
maxxi∈<m+ U







ai. (Market Clearance) (20)
3.1 Price Normalization
We normalize the prices to make the wealth of total endowment ā =
Pn
i=1 a
i of the economy
constant, which we assume to be 1 without loss of any generality. That is, we consider
7
normalized price vectors p in
P =
n
p ∈ <m+ |p · ā = 1
o
.
Definition 1 Let E = {X i, ui, ai}i∈N be an exchange economy. We say that a CE of E
with competitive allocation x∗ and price vector p∗ ∈ P is selected with default penalties μ if
(x∗, p∗) is a CE for Eμ.
Given default penalty vector μ, we call CEs for economy E that can be selected default-
qualified CEs (DCEs in short) with respect to μ. In the law the default penalties are
written as broad categories, not as individual penalties. In practice the litigation that often
accompanies default individualizes the penalties. Thus, including a vector of individual
penalties is reasonable.
The following theorem provides a connection of the DCEs with CEs.
Theorem 2 Let E = {X i, ui, ai}i∈N be an exchange economy and μ = (μi)ni=1 a vector of
default penalties. Assume E satisfies A1-A4. If (x∗, p∗) is a CE for Eμ, then there exists a
vector λ∗ ∈ <n++ with λ∗ ≤ μ, such that (x∗, p∗, λ∗) is a competitive triplet for E.
Proof. Let (x∗, p∗) be a CE for Eμ. By A4, p∗ ∈ <m++. From (6) and the non-satiation of ui




p∗ · ai − p∗ · xi ≥ xim+1,
p∗ · ai − p∗ · ā ≤ xim+1 ≤ 0, xi ∈ <m+ .
By the saddle-point characterization, there exists a number λ∗i ≥ 0 such that the triplet
(x∗i, x∗im+1, λ
∗i) satisfies
ui(xi) + μixim+1 + λ
∗i(p∗ · ai − p∗ · xi − xim+1)
≤
ui(x∗i) + μix∗im+1 + λ
∗i(p∗ · ai − p∗ · x∗i − x∗im+1)
≤
ui(x∗i) + μix∗im+1 + λ
i(p∗ · ai − p∗ · x∗i − x∗im+1)
(7)
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for all xi ∈ <m+ , p∗ · ai − p∗ · ā ≤ xim+1 ≤ 0, and for all λi ∈ <+.
The non-satiation of ui together with the first inequality in (7) implies λ∗i > 0. This in
turn with the second inequality in (7) implies







i and x∗im+1 ≤ 0 for all i, it follows from (8) that x∗im+1 = 0 for all i.
By (7), xim+1 = 0 implies (x
∗i, p∗, λ∗i) satisfies (3). Thus, (x∗, p∗, λ∗) is a competitive
triplet for E . Next, by taking xi to be x∗i in (7), the first inequality implies
(μi − λ∗i)xim+1 ≤ 0, ∀p∗ · ai − p∗ · ā ≤ xim+1 ≤ 0.
By A1 and A3, p∗ · ai < p∗ · ā. The inequality λ∗i ≤ μi follows automatically from the
above inequality.
If a competitive multiplier vector λ̄ associated with a CE of E is such that λ̄i > μi
for some trader i, then the per-unit penalty on trader i is not severe enough in the sense
that on the margin i gains from being in debt. When this occurs, the budget constraint
will be violated. Since no one ends as a net creditor, the market for commodities will be
imbalanced. Hence, the CE cannot be a DCE. A direct application of Theorem 2 implies:
Corollary 3 Let E = {Xi, ui, ai}i∈N be an exchange economy. Assume E satisfies A1-A4.
Then, given default penalties μ, only those CEs of E with multiplier vectors λ̄ ≤ μ are
selected.
Suppose that a CE of E is such that the associated competitive multiplier vector does
not Pareto dominate the competitive multiplier vector of every other CE. Then, Corollary
3 implies that the CE can be uniquely selected with traders’ individual per-unit default
penalties equal to their associated competitive multipliers. We now present two examples
9
with three CEs all having interior allocations such that the competitive multiplier vectors do
not Pareto dominate each other. Later, we show that these are examples of economies from
two classes in which the non-dominance in the Pareto sense among competitive multiplier
vectors holds.
Example 1: (Shapley and Shubik 1977) There are two goods and two traders with en-
dowments a1 = (40, 0), a2 = (0, 50), and utility functions u1(x1) = x11 + 100(1 − e−x
1
2/10),
u2(x2) = 110(1−ex21/10)+x22 on <2+. Traders 1 and 2 are respectively named Ivan and John
in Shapley and Shubik (1977); goods 1 and 2 are respectively called rubles and dollars in
that paper. There are three CEs all with interior allocations in this economy. Notice the
interior Pareto optimal allocations satisfy
x22 = x
2
1 + 50− 10 ln 110. (9)
Since 5u1(x1) = (1, 10e−x12/10) and 5u2(x2) = (11e−x21/10, 1), equation (9) implies that
to be Pareto optimal, trader 2’s consumption of good 2 increases with his consumption of
good 1. Since trader 1’s marginal utility of good 1 is constant and his marginal utility of
good 2 is decreasing while trader 2’s marginal utility of good 2 is constant and his marginal
utility of good 1 is decreasing, we have at any two interior Pareto optimal allocations x̄
and x̃
5ui(x̄i) · ā > 5ui(x̃i) · āi ⇔ 5uj(x̄j) · ā > 5uj(x̃j) · āj.
Thus, by (5), the competitive multiplier vectors do not dominate each other.
Example 2: There are two goods and two traders with endowments a1 ∈ <2+, a2 ∈ <2+,















2 > 0 and β < α
−1. (10)
When a1 = (1, 0), a2 = (0, 1), and α = β = (12/37)2, this example coincides with exercise
15.B.6 in Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995) and has three interior CEs.
10















)3 = K (11)








By (10), the above inequality contradicts to the allocation being feasible. This shows
K ≤ α−1. A similar argument shows that K ≥ β.

































































Hence, at interior Pareto optimal allocations with MRS equal to K, we have



















Simple calculation shows that 5u1(x1) · ā is decreasing while 5u2(x2) · ā is increasing in
K over the interval [β, α−1] of common marginal rates of substitution at interior Pareto
optimal allocations. Thus, by (5), the non-dominance in Pareto sense among competitive
multiplier vectors holds.
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3.2 Unique Selection of a CE
We now show that the quasi-linear economy in Example 1 and CES economy in Example
2 are examples from two general classes of economies, in which the competitive multiplier
vectors do not Pareto dominate each other.
Theorem 3 Let E = {X i, ui, ai}ni=1 be an economy satisfying A1, A20, and A4-A5. Then,
the competitive multiplier vectors of E do not Pareto dominate each other under either of
the following two further assumptions:
A6: For all i, ui is homogenous of degree 1.
A7: The number of consumers is equal to the number of commodities and the commodities
can be indexed such that for all i, there exist a function vi : <n−1+ −→ < and constant
θi > 0 with
ui(xi) = vi(xi−i) + θ
ixii,
where xi−i is the sub-bundle obtained from x
i by excluding xii.
Proof. Suppose first A6 is satisfied in addition to A1, A20, and A4-A5. By (5), at any
competitive triplet (x∗, p∗, λ∗),
5ui(x∗i) · x∗i = λ∗ip∗ · x∗i, i = 1, 2, · · · , n. (12)
Since
p∗ · x∗i = p∗ · ai, 5ui(x∗i) · x∗i = ui(x∗),
it follows from (12) that for all i






= p∗ · ā. (13)
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The first inequality holds because ui(x̃i) ≥ ui(ai) > 0 for all i and λ̂ Pareto dominates
λ̃, while the last inequality directly follows from Corollary 1. This shows that the Pareto
dominance of λ̂ over λ̃ leads to a contradiction to (14).
Suppose now A7 is satisfied in addition to A1, A20, and A4-A5. Then, for any two
competitive triplets (x̂, p̂, λ̂) and (x̃, p̃, λ̃) of E , from (5) it follows
θi = λ̂ip̂i = λ̃
ip̃i, i = 1, 2, · · · , n. (15)
Since












The non-Pareto dominance between competitive multiplier vectors follows easily from the
above equation.
Combining Theorem 3 with Corollary 3, we can now establish:
Corollary 4 Let E = {X i, ui, ai}i∈N be an exchange economy. Assume E satisfies A1, A3,
A20, and A4-A5. If in addition either A6 or A7 is satisfied, then every CE of E can be
uniquely selected with traders’ per-unit default penalties equal to their associated competitive
multipliers.
13
We end this section with an example to demonstrate the total cash flows of CEs under
our price normalization.
Example 3: Consider the 2-person economy of Shapley and Shubik (1977). If we normalize
the prices by the condition p · ā = 1, 000, so that the economy’s total wealth is always 1,000,
then from Table 1 in Shapley and Shubik (1977, p. 875) it follows that the competitive
price vectors, competitive multiplier vectors, total cash flows are as in the following table,
all with a two-digit decimal rounding off:
x∗ p∗ λ∗ TW TCF
CE1 ((32.26, 39.26), (7.74, 10.74)) (3.4, 17.27) (0.29, 0.06) 1000 704.34
CE2 ((13.17, 20.18), (26.83, 29.82)) (12.9, 9.68) (0.08, 0.1) 1000 541.45
CE3 ((3.22, 10.23), (36.78, 39.77)) (18.5, 5.19) (0.05, 0.19) 1000 733.52
In this table, TW stands for the total wealth of the economy and TCF for the total
cash flow. The cash flow required from trader i at prices p1, p2 and bundle xi is given by
p1max{0, xi1−ai1)+ p2max{0, xi2−ai2} and the total cash flow required in a CE is the sum
of the cash flows required from both traders at their respective equilibrium bundles and
the equilibrium prices. Notice that the middle CE (CE2) is the only CE with minimum
cash flow. To uniquely select it, we can set the per-unit default penalties equal to the
traders’ competitive multipliers 0.08 and 0.1. Alternatively, we can also choose a non-
discriminatory per-unit default penalty equal to 0.1. In fact, it follows from the proof of
Theorem 2 that any non-discriminatory per-unit default penalties between 0.1 and the next
highest maximum competitive multiplier which is equal to 0.19 would work.
4 Selection with Production
An economywith l goods, n traders, and household production is an array E = {(X i, ui, ai, Y i)}i∈N ,
where N is the trader set, Xi ⊆ <m is the consumption set of trader i, ui is i’s utility func-
14
tion, ai is his endowment bundle, and Y i ⊆ <m is his household production possibility set.9
An element yi in Y i represents a production plan that i can carry out. As usual, inputs
into production appear as negative components of yi and outputs as positive components.
For all i ∈ N , X i and Y i are closed and convex.
4.1 Competitive Allocations
A production plan changes a trader’s initial endowment before trading. Hence, the se-
lection of a production plan by an individual is guided by utility maximization instead
of profit maximization. However, with price-taking traders, utility maximization implies
profit maximization.
Definition 2 A CE for economy E = {(X i, ui, ai, Y i)}i∈N is a point
((x∗i, y∗i)i∈N , p
∗) ∈ (Πi∈N(Xi × Y i))×<m+
such that
(i) For i ∈ N , p∗ ·x∗i = p∗ · ai+ p∗ · y∗i and ui(xi) > ui(x∗i) implies p∗ ·xi > p∗ · ai+ p∗ · yi












In the Arrow-Debreu model of an economy with m < ∞ goods, there are a set, N , of
finitely many traders with trader i ∈ N characterized by the triplet (X i, ui, ai) and a set,
J , of producers with producer j ∈ J characterized by a production possibility set Y j.
In addition, each trader i is also endowed with a relative share θij of firm j’s profit (see
9This model of an economy was considered in Hurwicz (1960), Rader (1964), Shapley (1973), Billera
(1974), among others. Qin (1993) applies this model to study competitive outcomes in the cores of NTU
market games.
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Arrow and Debreu 1954, Debreu 1959). Symbolically, an Arrow-Debreu economy is an
array E = {{(Xi, ui, ai)}i∈N , {Y j}j∈J , {θij}i∈N,j∈J}. For all i ∈ N and all j ∈ J , Xi and Y j
are closed and convex.
Definition 3 A CE for E = {{(Xi, ui, ai)}i∈N , {Y j}j∈J , {θij}i∈N,j∈J} is a point
((x∗i)i∈N , (y
∗j)j∈J , p
∗) ∈ (Πi∈NXi)× (Xj∈JY j)×<m+
such that
(i0a) For i ∈ N , p∗ · x∗i = p∗ · ai +Pj∈J θijp∗ · y∗j and ui(xi) > ui(x∗i) implies p∗ · xi >
p∗ · ai +Pj∈J θijp∗ · y∗j;











The relative shares θij may be interpreted as representing private proprietorships of the
production possibilities and facilities. With this interpretation, we can think of trader i as
owning the technology set θijYj at his disposal in firm j. Consequently, we may think of





We denote elements in Ỹ i by ỹi =
P
j∈J θijy
ij for some yij ∈ Y j, j ∈ J . The reader is
referred to Rader (1964, pp. 160—163) and Nikaido (1968, p. 285) for a justification of this
understanding of the traders’ ownership shares. With equation (16), the Arrow-Debreu
economy E is converted into an economy with household production which we denote by
Ẽ = {(X i, ui, ai, Ỹ i)}i∈N .
Rader shows that an Arrow-Debreu economy E with convex production possibility sets
is equivalent to economy Ẽ , in the sense that the competitive allocations are the same
across the two economies (see Rader 1964, pp. 160—163):
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Theorem 4 Let E = {{(Xi, ui, ai)}i∈N , {Y j}j∈J , {θij}i∈N,j∈J} be an Arrow-Debreu econ-
omy and let Ẽ = {(Xi, ui, ai, Ỹ i)}i∈N with Ỹ i given in (12). Then, for any CE ((x∗i)i∈N ,
(y∗j)j∈J , p
∗) of E, there are production plans ỹ∗i ∈ Ỹ i, i ∈ N , such that ((x∗i, ỹ∗i)i∈N , p∗) is
a CE of Ẽ. Conversely, for any CE ((x∗i, ỹ∗i)i∈N , p∗) of Ẽ, there are production plans y∗j,
j ∈ J, such that ((x∗i)i∈N , (y∗j)j∈J , p∗) is a CE of E.
4.3 Rader’s Equivalence Principle
Rader (1964) considers how to transform an economy with household production into an
exchange economy using induced preferences. He shows that all the properties pertaining
to the traders’ characteristics in a production economy go over to the induced exchange
economy. Furthermore, the CEs of the original economy and those of the induced exchange
economy are equivalent (see Rader 1964, pp. 155-57). It follows that our credit mechanism
and results in the previous sections can be extended to a production economy via its induced
exchange economy.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we investigated the possibilities to enlarge the general-equilibrium structure by
allowing default subject to appropriate default penalties. The enlargement of the general
equilibrium structure results in a construction of a simple mechanism for a credit using
society to select a unique CE under certain conditions.10
The implementation of the mechanism involves a bank providing a credit money that
traders use as a direct and anonymous means of payment. The traders exchange personal
IOUs for the credit money without limit. But, they settle up all outstanding credits with
10The explicit introduction of default penalties allows the traders the option to break the usual budget
constraints whenever desirable. This option turns out to be essential for eliminating all but one CEs as
DCE.
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the bank at the end of the market. Ending as a net debtor is penalized while ending as a
net creditor is worthless.
We characterized the CEs that will be selected by the mechanism. They are those CEs
with traders’ marginal utilities of income dominated by the corresponding per-unit default
penalties. Applying this result, we showed that for two classes of economies the price
normalization calling for an equal value of total endowment guarantees that any CE can
be uniquely selected with default penalties equal to the associated competitive multipliers.
We stress that the introduction of a default penalty is fundamentally a game theoretic
addition. Viewing the process as a game of strategy, the budget constraint is no longer a
pure constraint but it is adhered to as a matter of strategic choice.
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